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The debate concerning America's Al 1 -Volunteer Force,
seven years after the elimination of the peacetime draft in
June 1973, is more controversial than ever before. It is
argued that the "quality" of recruits who enter the services
(especially the Army) is of lower caliber than historically
experienced. Proponents of conscription contend that the
quality of accessions is not representative of the population
at large. They consistently compare the education, race and
mental abilities of today's All -Vo lunteer Force (AVF) entrants
with the same qualities of those who enlisted (or were inducted)
during the conscription years. A more helpful comparison would
be to compare the socioeconomic characteristics of today's force
with the characteristics that would be present if conscription
were still being used.
This thesis sets the frame for that analysis examining
military representativeness during the Vietnam draft ye'ars,
comparing it to the socioeconomic and quality characteristics
of the general population of the same period. It tracks a
cohort of young men, 14 to 17 years of age in 1966, through a
period of seven draft years (1966 to 1973).

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. HISTORY OF THE DRAFT 10
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 18
III. METHODOLOGY 29
A. DATA BASE 29
B. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE 32
C. DATA LIMITATIONS 32
IV. REPRESENTATIVENESS ; 34
A. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY VERSUS
NON -MILITARY 3 5
1. Education 35
2. Mental Aptitude 36
3. Race 38
4. Geographic Regions 38
5. Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental
Family 41
6. Rotter Scale 43
7. Duncan Index 44
B. MULTIPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY VERSUS
NON "MILITARY 46
1. Education by Race 46
2. Mental Aptitude by Race 47
3. Geographic Regions by Race 47
4. Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental Family
by Race
5Q
5. Rotter Scale by Race _o

6. Duncan Index by Race ' 53
7. Education by Geographic Region 55
8. Mental Aptitude by Geographic Region 59
9. Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental
Family by Geographic Region 59
10. Rotter Scale by Geographic Region 67
11. Duncan Index by Geographic Region 70
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUCTEES VERSUS ENLISTEES 74
1. Education 77
2. Mental Aptitude 78
3. Race 82
4. Geographic Regions 83
5. Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental
Family 86
6. Rotter Scale 88
7. Duncan Index 90
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 9 9




1 ACTIVE DUTY MALE ENLISTED NPS ACCESSIONS, FISCAL
YEARS 1954-1973 15
2 COHORT YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, 1973 36
3 IQ DISTRIBUTION 37
4 RACIAL PARTICIPATION RATES 39
5 CENSUS DIVISION OF RESIDENCE, 1966 40
6 GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, 1966 41
7 INDEX OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF PARENTAL FAMILY 42
8 ROTTER SCALE 44
9 DUNCAN INDEX 45
10 YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY RACE, 1973 48
11 IQ DISTRIBUTION BY RACE 49
12 GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS BY RACE, 1966 51
13 INDEX OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF PARENTAL FAMILY
BY RACE 52
14 ROTTER SCALE BY RACE 54
15 DUNCAN INDEX BY RACE 55
16 YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
BY RACE, 1973 57
17 IQ DISTRIBUTION BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION BY RACE 60
18 INDEX OF SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF PARENTAL
FAMILY BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION BY RACE 64
19 ROTTER SCALE BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION BY RACE 67
20 DUNCAN INDEX BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION BY RACE 71
21 METHOD OF ENTRY BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED




22 METHOD OF ENTRY BY IQ DISTRIBUTION BY RACE 80
23 METHOD OF ENTRY BY RACE 84
24 METHOD" OF ENTRY BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION BY RACE 85
25 METHOD OF ENTRY BY INDEX OF SOCIOECONOMIC
STATUS OF PARENTAL FAMILY BY RACE 87
26 METHOD OF ENTRY BY ROTTER SCALE BY RACE 89




1 SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR YOUNG MEN 17

I . HISTORY OF THE DRAFT
The generations of people living in the United States
today are survivors of an era of history during which con-
scription had been integrated into America's way-of-life.
With the enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1917,
our country developed the policy that manpower procurement
to maintain a large military force during wartime should be
heavily dependent on conscription. Since those early days
of World War I, there has been considerable opposition to
the draft, especially when considering peacetime conscrip-
tion. The strength of the argument for the draft was held
to be that all eligible men would serve in some way.
Historically, the use of the draft in the United States
has been more the exception than the rule. In fact, until
the Civil War, nation-wide military conscription was unheard
of in America. During the Revolutionary War some colonies
did resort to the use of conscripts to fill their militia,
but, despite the efforts of George Washington and the Con-
tinental Congress, national conscription was never imple-
mented. In the War of 1812, an executive request by President
Madison for federal legislation to draft male citizens into
mandatory service met with such strong opposition that the
war was over before any action was completed in Congress.
10

With the onset of the Civil War, volunteers flooded both
the armies of the North and the South. By mid 1862, however,
the South had to resort to compulsory conscription to fill its
dwindling forces and within a year the Union did likewise.
The Conscription Act of 1863, the nation's first compulsory
military service law, required all men between 20 and 45 years
of age to register for the draft. However, under this law,
any prospective conscript was allowed the opportunity to buy
temporary exemption from the Army for the sum of $300, or he
could be permanently exempt if he hired a substitute to fight
in his place. These exemptions brought about inequities in
favor of the rich which were partly responsible for subsequent
bloody riots and violence.
Conscription was dropped after the Civil War, not to be
revived again until 1917, the year the United States entered
World War I. Widely attacked as unconstitutional, the Selective
Service Act of 1917 established a broad system of local selec-
tive service boards. Within three weeks of passage, 10 million
men were registered for the draft. The legislation provided
for classification of male registrants "into one of five
categories according to their 'value' to the civil sector. "
Class I contained those men of least value, thereby allowing
them to be inducted first. "This, of course, led to an
Cooper, R.V.L., Military Manpower and the Al 1 -Vo lunteer
Force ( R-1450-ARPA) , Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation,
September, 1977, p. 53.
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overr epres enta tion of the poor and blacks, as illustrated by
the fact that blacks constituted 9.6% of all registrants but
2
accounted for 13% of the inductions." The legislation also
provided for exemptions to certain categories of conscientious
objectors and certain hardship cases. In the course of the war,
some 2.8 million men were drafted. Conscription was discontinued
with the signing of the Armistice in 1918.
In September 16, 1940, Congress passed the Selective Ser-
vice Training Act of 1940, the first peacetime draft in the
nation's history. Modeled after the World War I plan, the
question of compulsory service again brought about debate on
the question of its constitutionality. Those opposing the
draft advocated citizen's rights, while the supporters defended
the position that the draft was the only equitable way to en-
sure a strong standing military force in which all eligible men
would serve
.
Initially, those inducted were required to serve for a
period of one year. However, following the attack on Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, just as the sentiment of conscrip-
tion changed so did the length of compulsory service. The period
of service now was for the duration of the war plus six months.
Before the end of the war, all males between the ages of





Board controlled the entire military procurement procedure.
Although it rarely met its monthly quota, the draft neverthe-
less provided some 10 million of the nearly 15 million Americans
who served in World War II. It should be noted, however, there
were close to 45 million registrants.
The 1940 Selective Service Act was allowed to expire in
March, 1947, but with the threat of Soviet Expansion in Europe,
President Truman asked for a new law which would require universal
military training (UMT) for all able-bodied young men. After
much debate, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948,
which in essence was a reenactment of the 1940 Act ruling out
UMT. In January 1949, the Army ended its two-year enlistments,
raised its entry standards and refused to accept married vol-
unteers. Nevertheless, enlistments were up and only 30,000
men were inducted between June 1948 and the outbreak of the
Korean War. Then in 1951, as the war entered its second year,
Congress passed the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, which established the Selective Service System as a per-
manent agency and made all males between the ages of 18 1/2
and 25 eligible for induction. The Act was extended in 1955,
1959, and 1963.
During the early 1960's, 95% of the young men between the
ages of 18 and 35 were excluded from 1-A (qualified for
military service) classification. There was an excess of
eligible youth and the Selective Service System had problems
13

in allocating them. Induction standards were again increased
and pay remained below the civilian levels. Still there
were many volunteers and the draft calls remained relatively
small (See Table 1). In 1963 there were only 74,000 inductions
which constituted only 20% of the male non-prior service (NPS)
accessions. With the increase of the United States' involve-
ment in Vietnam, draft calls rose sharply (to a level of 103,000
in 1965) and much attention was focussed on the draft. Mount-
ing criticism led to major changes in the Selective Service
System policies. The new Military Selective Service Act of
1967 contained certain reforms; mainly in the order of
selection, which was reversed to take 19 year olds and ex-
college students first. Deferment criteria were also tightened.
Draft calls rose to an annual high of 340,000 (or 40.9% of
total male NPS accessions) in 1968, and in 1969 the lottery
system was introduced. Of the 6 million men who served in
3
the Armed Forces during the Vietnam years, 25% were draftees.
In 1979, President Nixon proposed elimination of the peace-
time draft and in 1973 the Selective Service Law lapsed
giving way to a professional, All-Volunteer Force. A com-
bination of a reduction in military manpower strength and a
dramatic increase in the number of young men 19 years of age
made the end of the draft a true possibility.
The Report of the President's Commission on an All-
Volunteer Armed Force
,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government

























































Sources : Statistical Abstract of the United States and
OASD (MRA&L) , America's Volunteers.
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As shown in Figure 1, in the mid-1950's approximately
80% of the eligible young male population was required to
provide the manpower strengths of the services. In the
early 1960's, that requirement had dropped to about 60%, and
in 1980, less than 25% will be needed. These dynamic pop-
ulation and military strength changes have brought the equity
issue to the forefront of debate about who will serve when
less than one-fourth of the eligible population is needed.
The military will utilize a limited portion of the population.
The question of representativeness concerns the socioeconomic
characteristics of those who serve in the military vis-a-vis their




Figure 1. Supply and demand for young men




II . LITERATURE REVIEW
The debate concerning the equity and representativeness
of the draft has been one of concern since the inception of
conscription in the Civil War. The Conscription Act of 1863
provided monetary and substitution exemptions by law which
favored the rich. The classification system inherent in
the Selective Service Act of 1917 led to an "over-repr es enta-
4
tion of the poor and black, since those individuals who were
judged to be of a lesser value to society were inducted first.
Subsequently, the Selective Service Training Act of 1940, the
Selective Service Act of 1948, and the Universal Military Train-
ing Act of 1951 consolidated with their many amendments, allowed
for deferments, which again favored those individuals who were
able to afford the cost of avoiding compulsory service.
Even though conscription had become a standard policy
for military procurement, the fact that of the nearly two
million men reaching draft age during the late 1960's only
one-half to one-third of them would be needed, precipitated
studies for alternatives to the Selective Service System.
One such study was a Presidential board, the National Ad-
visory Commission on Selective Service (referred to as the
Marshall Commission after its Chairman, Burke Marshall) which
4 Cooper, R. V. L
.
, op cit, p. 51.
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was established by Executive Order of President Johnson in
1966. It was charged with considering the Selective Service
System and its function in the past, present and prospective
future in light of the following factors:
Fairness to all citizens; military manpower require-
ments; the objective of minimizing uncertainty and
interference with individual careers and education;
social, economic and employment conditions and goals;
budgetary and administrative considerations; and any
other factors that the Commission may deem relevant.
The Commission was also instructed to make recommenda-
tions for improvements in classification, selection, qualifica-
tion^ deferment and exemption of individuals and to evaluate
alternatives to the draft. Although the study's findings
rejected the feasibility of an All-Volunteer Force, it did
recognize that improvements involving deferments were re-
quired .
The Marshall Commission gave high level consideration
to the draft and blacks. Its findings are stated in the sum-
mary of its conclusions as follows:
The Commission gave careful study to the effect of the
draft on and its fairness to the Negro. His position
in the military manpower situation is in many ways dis-
proportionate, even though he does not serve in the Armed
Forces out of proportion to his percentage of the population.
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service,
In Pursuit of Equity: Who Serves When not All Serv e? Washington,
D.C.,: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p.l.
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He is under represented (1.3%) on local draft boards. The
number of men rejected for service reflects a much higher
percentage (almost 50%) of Negro men found disqualified
than of whites (25%). And, yet, recent studies indicate
that proportionately more (30%) Negroes of the group
qualified for services are drafted than whites (18%) -
primarily because fewer Negroes are admitted into
Reserves or officer training programs. Enlistment rates
for qualified Negroes and whites are about equal, but re-
enlistments for Negroes are higher: Department of De-
fense figures show that the rate of first-term reenlist-
ments is now more than double that of white troops. Negro
soldiers have a high record of volunteering for service in
.,
elite combat units. This is reflected in, but could not
be said to be the sole reason for, the Negro's over-
representation in combat (in terms of his proportion of
the population): Although Negro troops account for only
11% of the total U.S. enlisted personnel in Vietnam, Negro
soldiers comprise 14.5% of all Army units, and in Army
combat units the proportion is, according to the Depart-
ment of Defense, "appreciably higher" than that. During
the first 11 months of 1966, Negro soldiers totalled 22.4%
of all Army troops killed in action.
Realizing that complete equity could never exist when
only some men out of a large pool are inducted, the Com-
mission sought a system which would operate as equitably
as possible. Its recommendations included an impartial ran-
dom selection for order of call, and a cancellation of the
deferment system. All members of the Commission agreed that
the deferment policy was most inequitable for it had gotten
to the point that "what starts out as a temporary deferment
for college enrollment is easily extended into a de facto
exemption - by graduate school, by occupation, by father-







The result of the study was the passage of the 1967
Military Selective Service Act which contained certain re-
forms - chiefly in the order of selection, which was re-
versed to take 19 year-olds and ex-college students first.
Then, in 1969, President Nixon signed into law what was
labeled the lottery system. It reduced the period of draft
vulnerability from seven years to one year, the calendar year
following an individual's 19th birthday. Draft selections
would be made by drawing sequence numbers at random based on
birth dates. A new drawing was held each year. Thus men
were able to make career and family plans while being liable
to a more equitable draft system for one year only. In 1970,
by Executive Order, occupational and paternity deferments
were phased out and in 1971 the Draft Extension and Military
Pay Bill eliminated undergraduate student deferments for
those entering college in the fall of 1971 and thereafter.
While this may have been a more equitable system, it was
still conscription, and, in 1969, President Nixon appointed
an Advisory Commission on the All-Volunteer Armed Force
(referred to as the Gates Commission, after its Chairman,
Thomas S. Gates, Jr.). The members were charged with devel-
oping a plan to eliminate conscription and move toward the
All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Again, the equity issue was de-
bated with the major objection being, that, with the recom-
mended higher pay the force would be especially appealing
21

to blacks and the poor, and therefore a disproportionate number
of blacks and lower-income whites would be in the military ser-
vice.
The Commission projected that the enlistment rate of blacks
would increase in the AVF but that it would not exceed 19%.
By increasing military pay it was expected that the services
would be a more attractive market for those having higher civil-
ian earning potential. Due to the current mental, physical
and moral standards, it was felt that the representativeness of
the socioeconomic groups would not become disproportionate.
Subsequently, with the disengagement from Southeast Asia and
the rapid reduction of military strength, draft calls were ended,
and in June 1973 the draft authority expired.
Although the debate on the representative issue contin-
ues today with the inception of the AVF, the question as to
criteria for representativeness is seldom addressed. Hunter
and Nelson commenting on the racial composition of the Armed
Forces s ta ted
:
The trend toward the increasing black content commenced
during the draft era. This can be attributed in part
to the dramatic increase in the proportion of blacks
eligible for military services, specifically the increas-
ing number of black high school graduates and the larger
percentage of blacks placing in levels on the mental
aptitude tests required for service entry. There is also
the combined push of the disproportionately high unemploy-
ment rate among black youth and the pull of military ser-





in offering equal opportunities for minorities.
Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird corroborated these
facts in a 1972 report to the President. He states that
"the proportion of blacks and other racial minorities in
the Armed Forces is expected to grow... (and) this pro-
portion may exceed the percentage of minorities in the
Nation's population, reflecting the apparent fact that
minority members find better career opportunities and over-
9
all treatment in the military than in civilian life."
In an economic analysis of manpower procurement, Canby
examined the equity question in terms of regional represen-
tation within the selective service and lottery systems. The
administrative procedures of the SSS allocated draft calls on
the basis of geographic quotas which were in turn based on
local population counts. This gave the appearance of geo-
graphic equity for those elegible for service when j.n fact
there was a wide range of percentage differences. Wealthy
o
Hunter, R. W., and Nelson, G. R., The All-Voluntee r
Force. Has it worked? Will it work?
,
Paper prepared for the
All-Volunteer Force versus Conscription Conference, Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 13-16
December 1979, p. 13.
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense
,
Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving the All-
Volunteer Force (P.L~ 92-129) , Report to the President and the
Chairman of the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972, p. 25.
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communities, where a large percentage of students and occupational
deferments resulted in relatively few 1-A classifications, had
low draft call quotas. Furthermore, low income states, which
historically had shown a high rate of mental disqualifications,
also had a low number of 1-A's and low quotas relative to the
population. As a result "the midwestern pairie states, which
had relatively low college attendance rates and the lowest mental
disqualification rates (5-10%), were disproportionately bur-
A A M 10dened .
Another problem which was inherent in the selective sys-
tem was the proration of individuals due to enlistments. Since
a geographic area's quota is reduced by its enlistments, "credits
(due to enlistments) benefit poor areas with higher volunteer
rates by reducing the draft's incidence upon the remainder. A
locality's incidence of military service is thus determined by the
size of its 1-A pool; its draft rate, by its 1-A pool and its
enlistment credits." In fact, due to the quirks in the admin-
istrative procedures, one draft board may have no inductions
due to enlistment credits, while another board may induct a very
high percentage of its eligible pool.
C a n b y , S . L . , Military Manpower Procurement , Lex-




Canby further describes the lottery as a simple work-
able system which "gives at best only an illusion of fair-
12 ....
ness." Local quotas allowed for disparities in deferments
and disqualification rates which in turn shifted the burden
of the draft from one region to another. Although there were
several problems with the lottery, the major issue was politi-
cal in that the military was pressured to alter its acceptance
criteria in order to obtain a more inclusive social representa-
tion. If the services were dissatisfied with the quality of ran-
dom selectees, they were expected to set up special training
programs. In essence, the lottery pressured the military to
lower its acceptance standards and to upgrade selectees,
rather than to reject low quality recruits and demand better
replacement s
.
Moskos and King discuss representation in terms of racial
composition and education level. Moskos argues that these
"quality" issues should be of major concern to the public
emphasizing that the military today is not characteristically
representative of the population of the United States. Using
current force data he constantly evaluates the AVF by comparing
the data with figures from the pre-Vietnam draft era, specifically








black content in the Army predates the All-Volunteer Force,"
he fails to predict what the force make-up would be had the
draft been allowed to continue. When describing educational
levels, he shows concern for an increase in the percentage of
lower educated whites combined with an increase in the number
i
of blacks mentally eligible for enlistment. Again, Moskos fails
to predict what these figures may have been had conscription
not been discontinued.
King shows concern with how Americans perceive the com-
position of the military in terms of racial and educational
mix. He contends that the issue is one of social context
rather than one of effectiveness. Both Moskos and King
fail to examine the representativeness of the military during
the draft era in terms of several other relevant characteristics,
such as socioeconomic status. While race and education are
highly visible criteria, the issue involves more than just
these "quality" factors.
14 . . ...Moskos, C.C. Jr., Serving in the Ranks: Citizenship
and the All-Volunteer Force
,
Paper prepared for the All-Vol-
unteer versus Conscription Conference, Hoover Institute on War,
Revolution and Peace, Stanford, 13-16 December 1979, p. 7.
King, W . R
.
, Achieving America's Goals: National Service
or the All-Volunteer Force?
,
Report prepared for the Committee
on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress,
First Session, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, March 1977, pp. 27-31.
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Cooper discusses representativeness in terms of socio-
economic background and individual characteristics. Shields
has intensively studied the issue during the Vietnam draft
era and has discovered that unemployment, potential wages,
residence, draft pressure, health and socioeconomic status
are all relevant to volunteer ism . The findings of both
Cooper and Shields clearly show that representation in the
military involves more than just the racial and educational
issues. However, they too have failed to examine the actual
characteristics of those individuals who did serve when
selective service was law.
The Commissions, studies, and critics discussed above
base their suppositions on statistics relevant to their cause.
While their findings concern issues involved with the debate
on the AVF , not one study has questioned where the issue of re-
presentativeness might be today had conscription been allowed
to continue. And, although it was commonly held that the draft
provided a more equitable cross section of the American popula-
tion, few studies have looked intensively at the representa-
tiveness of the Armed Forces prior to the end of the draft.
16
17
Cooper, R. V. L., op cit, pp. 204-231
Shields, P.M., Enlistment During the Vietnam Er a a nd
the Representation issue o f the AVF
,
Unpublished manuscript,
Ohio State University, 1979, pp. 16-27.
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This thesis will examine the representativeness of the Armed
Forces during the concluding years of the draft in terms of






The data used in this thesis were extracted from informa-
tion collected in the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS)
conducted by the Center for Human Resource Research of Ohio
State University under contract by the Office of Manpower
Policy, Evaluation and Research (now the Office of Policy,
Evaluation and Research of Manpower Administration) of the
U.S. Department of Labor. The surveys involved a study
of the labor market experience of four groups of the United
States population: men 45-59 years of age, women 30-44, and
young men and women 14-24. These four groups were selected
because each faced different labor market problems. Studies
were performed on each of the groups to identify character-
istics that were important in explaining variations in several
important facets of labor market experience. The variables
included demographic, economic, attitudinal and social
characteristics. Interviews were conducted yearly from 1966
through 1971 and again in 1973. The Bureau of Census was
responsible for survey operations and data processing, while
the Center for Human Resource Research analyzed the data and
prepared reports on the survey.
It is from the young men group that the information
for this thesis is extracted. The universe of the data
29

consists of men (14-24 years of age in 1966) who. were randomly
selected from the civilian non-institutionalized population.
The sample was drawn from households in 235 areas that con-
stituted the primary sampling units in an earlier experimental
Monthly Labor Survey conducted for the Bureau of Labor Statistics
between 1964 and 1966.
"In order to provide statistically reliable estimates
for black youth and to permit a more confident analysis
of differences in labor market experience and occupational
aspirations between blacks and whites, the former were over-
represented in the sample by a three-to-one ratio. The
sample consists of 5,225 individuals, of whom 3,734 are
white. 18
Since the black population was approximately 12% at the time
the survey was taken, and since no attempt in this thesis was
made to weight the cases, results are presented separately by
race in most instances. Interest is focussed on relative
magnitude i.e., proportions, rather than absolute numbers.
Accordingly, analysis of the data is presented in terms of
percentages .
Included in the design of the NLS were questions con-
cerning Armed Forces participation. Responses to these
1 8
U. S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration,
Career Thresholds (vol. 1), Washington D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing utt ice, 1970, p. 3.
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questions made it possible to determine who, in any given
cohort group j had military service during the survey years.
However, the NLS did not interview individuals while they
were in the military, so the only way to obtain this infor-
mation was from post-service responses. There is virtually
no way to determine who was in the Armed Forces during the
final year of the survey.
The cohort for this study was constructed from young men
who were 14 through 17 years of age in 1966, and who had never
served in the Armed Forces as of 1966. The maximum age of
17 was selected in order to get a truer picture of those in
the survey who would be draft eligible during the NLS time
frame. Anyone 18 or older would not be as susceptible to
the draft since those year groups had already been tapped
for a large number of inductions. The sample size of the
cohort was N=1804 of which 429 (or 23.8%) were black.
The cohort was subsequently divided into two subgroups:
(1) military (N=464) and (2) non-military (N=1340). The
military included those young men who served in the Armed
Forces for a period of at least six months after 1966 and
who were discharged prior to 1973. The non-military sub-
group included those men who had never served in the military
during the same time.
Individual characteristics, which include education, mental
aptitude, and race for the cohort were extracted from the NLS
31

and compared within each subgroup. Social variables, in-
cluding geographic residence, Duncan index, Rotter scale
and a constructed socioeconomic index were also compared
between subgroups. Further comparisons of the same character-
istics within the cohort by race and geographic region are
included in order to obtain more insightful results. An
analysis of the representative issue was conducted by
empirically testing to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses about
the equivalent relationship of the proportional distributions
of each characteristic between the populations represented by
the cohort subgroups.
B. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE
Analysis of the available information was conducted
through the use of frequency distributions of cases within
contingency tables. This was accomplished with the use of
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) in-
tegrated computer program. The joint frequency distributions,
called cr os
s
tabula t ions , were statistically analyzed by tests
of significance using the Chi-square statistic, to determine
whether or not the variables were statistically independent.
A second test conducted was the Chi-square test of homo-
geneity.
C. DATA LIMITATIONS
As previously stated, the NLS did not survey anyone who
was in the military in 1966, nor did it question anyone
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initially surveyed while he was in the military. Therefore,
there may be a number of the cohort who are still in the
military in the last year of the survey. From the data
available, there is no way to extract information concerning
those unavailable for interview in 1973, nor is there any
way to find out how many were in the military at that time.
Not everyone in the cohort answered each interview ques-
tion. Therefore, many of the variables are not completely
represented for the entire cohort and the total number will
be less than N=1804, e.g. the question concerning method
of entry into the Armed Forces. The number of individuals
in the structured cohort who responded that they either en-
listed or were drafted was so small that population distributions
were untestable. Furthermore, there is no way to determine
who enlisted due to draft pressure.
In summary, this thesis will examine and compare the
individual and social characteristics of the military and
non-military subgroups. In so doing, hypotheses will be
tested to determine the relationships of the distributions
of the characteristics for the military vis-a-vis civilian
populations during the draft years, for which the cohort sub-
groups are treated as samples. Further analysis will involve
comparing the same characteristics between inductees and en-




It is not always clear what the definition of representa-
tiveness entails. The issue, as was shown in the literature
review, is usually discussed in terms of the relevant popula-
tion with one or more economic or social variables used for
comparison. However, unlike previous studies which often
compared social characteristics of two remotely different
cohorts, this thesis will examine individual and social
characteristics of two subgroup populations, i.e., military
and civilian, within one cohort population. The structure of
this study involves: first, an inspection and comparison of
seven characteristics: education, mental aptitude, race,
geographic residence, Duncan index, Rotter scale, and a
constructed socioeconomic index within each of two subgroups,
military and non-military, of the cohort of 14-17 year-olds
constructed from the NLS ; and secondly, an inspection and
comparison of multiple characteristics of the same two sub-
groups. An examination of the differences in the characteris
tics of inductees and enlistees follows in order to gain
additional insight into how such characteristics vary with
the method of entry in the military.
Hypotheses are constructed to test the significance of
any differences in characteristics between populations re-
presented by relevant subgroups. Results of the tests
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are included here in the form of descriptive summaries.
Tables are included to present the proportional distributions
and to facilitate interpretation of differences in the dis-
tributions. Percentages in the tables, indicated by parentheses,
are row percentages, unless otherwise indicated.
A. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY VERSUS NON-MILITARY
1 . Education
Table 2 presents data on the number of years of school
completed by 1973 for the cohort and the two subgroups: military
and non-military. For the full cohort 86.4% had at least a
high school education, and 46.4% had some college education.
The participants in the military had a high school completion
rate of 89.7% while the non-military group had a completion rate
of 85.3%. Chi-square homogeneity tests show this difference
in high school completion rate between military and non-military
populations to be statistically significant (a = .013). The
proportion of military participants, 30.2%, who had some college
education, however, is significantly (a=.0001) lower than the
non-military population, 52.1%.
These figures indicate that the military was not re-
presentative with respect to education attainment. In other
words, the military had an overr epresentat ion of high school
graduates and an underr epresentat ion of college educated in-




results support Cooper's findings and they substantiate
the "quality" standards of the services; that is, the
high school graduate is the most desirable recruit. The
disparity in the percentages of young men with some college
education is also not surprising, since student deferment
was one way of avoiding the draft during the early years
of the NLS.
TABLE 2
Cohort Years of School Completed, 1973
















(2) =99.75; significance = 0.0000
', ",
2 . Mental Aptitude
During the NLS years, the Armed Forces measured, the
mental aptitudes of its recruits using the Armed Froces Quali-
fication Test (AFQT) as a standard scoring device. The scores
19 Cooper, R. V. L., op cit, p. 208
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were based on percentiles and recruits were classified into
one of five mental categories with Category I being the
highes t
.
The NLS data does not contain records of AFQT scores.
The mental ability distributions were represented by IQ
scores, which have cultural biases. Table 3 presents the
IQ scores of the cohort taken at about the 10th grade for
each individual. The scores are partitioned into quintiles
and are not the AFQT mental groups.
The figures show that the military subgroups had con-
sistently higher proportions in each of the four lower quintiles.
Although military IQ scores appear to be normally distributed,
the lower two quintiles were significantly (<*=.003) over-
represented, and the highest quintile was significantly (as. 0000)
underr epresented . Thus, the military was not representative of
the civilian population in terms of mental ability.
TABLE 3
IQ Dis tr ibution
Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Upper
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Military 53 74 81 76 59
(15.5) (21.6) (23.6) (22.2) (17.2)
Non-Military 121 130 181 168 268
(13.9) (15.0) (20.9) (19.4) (30.9)
TOTALS 174 204 262 244 327









The most frequently used characteristic when describ-
ing social representation in the military is racial composition.
Table 4 provides the data on the numbers of whites, blacks,
and other races in each of the military and non-military sub-
groups. It should be reemphasized here that the blacks were
oversampled in relation to their proportion in the population
in order to obtain reliable statistics. Since all racial
comparisons in this study are made with respect to participation
rates of blacks and whites, the resultant comparisons are valid
to the extent that sample cases accurately reflect blacks and
whites in the population.
Summarizing the information, the blacks did have a higher
participation rate in the military, 28.7%, when compared to the
whites, 25.0%. Chi-square tests, however, show that the black
participation rate for the population is not significantly




Table 5 presents the cohort's 1966 census division
of residence in terms of geographic regions. Chi-square
tests showed that the military was statistically representative
in each of the nine regions (at the .01 level).
In order to work with larger cell sizes, and in
keeping with the pattern of previous studies concerning military

















TOTALS 1356 429 19
X (2) = 4.62; significance = 0.0993
Notes :
1. Parentheses indicate co lumn percentages
time, the division was between South and non-South, the
former being constructed from the South Atlantic, East South
Central and West South Central regions. The non-South
division included the remaining six areas.
Table 6 represents the reconstructed regions, describing
the military participation rates in a more concise manner.
The figures show that the two new regions are proportionately
representative in the military and non-military subgroups.
Further calculations found that the South military participa-
tion rate, 26.4%, was statistically ( a=.30) the same as the
non-South rate, 25.3%. Therefore, the military was socially
represen ta ti tive in terms of geographic residence, whether





Census Division of Residence, 1966
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X , >. = 11.95; significance = 0.1534\o)
Notes :












X (1) = 0.208; significance = 0,6481
5. Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental Famil I
The socioeconomic index is a constructed variable
attempting to describe the family background and environment in
which the respondents grew up. The variable is based on the
following five components: father's occupation, father's
education, mother's education, education of oldest older
sibling and availability of reading material in the home.
Each of the components is mathematically assigned a coded
number and when added together provides an index of family
status. The larger the index, the higher the socioeconomic
status. Index values range from to 158 with lower values
indicating a lower social status.
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Table 7 shows the distribution of the index among the
cohort broken into four levels. Both the military and non-
military subgroups have the highest concentration of individuals
between the index levels of 100 and 120. However, the military
is significantly overrepr esented (a=.0001) below the index of
100 and underrepresented ( a= .0001) above 120.
The statistics indicate that the military population
predominantly came from families with a lower social status
when compared to the non-military population as measured by
the socioeconomic index variable.
TABLE 7
Index of Socioeconomic Status of Parental Family
INDEX LEVELS
0-80 81-100 101-120 121 Plus
Military 65 151 169 60
(14.7) (33.9) (38.0) (13.5)
Non-military 194 319 485 280
(15.2) (25.0) (37.9) (21.9)
TOTALS 259 470 654 340
(15.0) (27.3) (38.0) (19.7)
2
X (3) = 21.69; significance = 0.0001
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6 . Rotter Scale
The Rotter Scale is an index constructed from a
series of eleven questions attempting to measure an in-
dividual's locus of control; that is, the degree to which
a person believes that his actions can influence his out-
come in life. Responses to each question were assigned
numerical values from one to four. The values are summed
and those who have a lower index (minimum of 11) are class-
ified as Interna Is . Internals believe their behavior to be
relatively decisive in determining their fate. At the other
end of the index scale (maximum of 44) are Externa Is , those
who believe their behavior to be less decisive. They believe
that chance, luck, or powerful agencies exert a very strong
20influence on what happens to them.
Table 8 lists the distribution of Rotter scale values
for the cohort. Chi-square tests show that a significantly
(a= .0000) higher proportion of the military subgroups, 46.8%,
was classified as most internal (index = 11-15). The mid-
range values (16-30) were significantly under repres ented
(a = .0000) in the military, 74.9%, and a significantly ( a = .007)
higher propor t ion , 6 . 9% , of the non-military subgroup was classified
external (index = 31-44).
20 ...Hamner , W.C., and Organ, D.W., Or ganizational Qehavior
,
Dallas: Business Publications, Inc., 1978, pp. 176-177.
4 3

The figures indicate that the military population
had a significantly larger number of individuals who believe
that there was a strong orderly relationship between their
behavior and its consequences (internal locus of control).






11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Military 217 80 95 55 17
(46.8) (17.2) (20.5) (11.9) (3.7)
Non-military 244 339 406 258 93
(18.2) (25.3) (30.3) (19.3) (6.9)
TOTALS 461 419 501 313 110
(25.6) (23.2) (27.8) (17.4) (6.1)
X
2 (4) = 148.56; significance = 0.0000
7 . Duncan Index
The Duncan index is another socioeconomic status
score derived from national surveys which ranked occupations
according to social prominance and economic worth. Therefore,
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an occupation which is regarded by society as being highly
respectable and which receives a fairly large salary would
receive a high Duncan index value. The index used in the NLS
refers to the cohort member's head of household occupation and
has a range of - 96. Table 9 presents the Duncan index for
the cohort. The military subgroup has a significantly (a = .0002)
higher percentage of low Duncan scores (index = 0-20), while the
non-military subgroup has a significantly (a = .0002) higher
percentage of high scores (index = 61 plus). The midrange
(21-60) are approximately the same between the two subgroups.
Thus, the military population came from families whose fathers
had less prominent occupations than the non-military population




0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Military 235 34 43 46 50 20
(54.9) (7.9) (10.0) (10.7) (11.7) (4.7)
Non-Military 574 106 125 125 212 94
(46.4) (8.6) (10.1) (10.1) (17.2) (7.6)
TOTALS 809 140 168 171 262 114
(48.6) (8.4) (10.1) (10.3) (15.7) (6.9)
X
2 (5) = 14.995; significance = 0.0104
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B. MULTIPLE CHARACTERISTICS OF MILITARY VERSUS NON-MILITARY
1 . Education by Race
As discussed previously, after describing the in-
dividual characteristics of the military and non-military sub-
groups of the cohort, further breakdown by race and geographic
residence would be examined. Table 10 presents data on the
number of school years completed by 1973 for the cohort, broken
down by race. The table shows that 90.1% of the whites and
74.6% of the blacks had at least a high school education, with
51.7% of the whites and 28.7% of the blacks having had some
college education. Closer examination shows that, within the white
cohort, the military participant's high school completion rate,
91,4%, was not significantly (a = .18) different from the non-
military completion rate, 89.7%. The blacks with military ser-
vice, on the other hand, had a significantly (a = .001) higher
high school completion rate, 84.6%, than the non-military blacks,
74.6%. The college experience rate was significantly (a .002)
greater in the non-military population for both the whites,
57.5%,and blacks, 18.7%.
These figures support the earlier findings, in that
the military is not representative with respect to education
attainment. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that previous
examination of the entire cohort found that the military
population had a significantly higher high school graduation
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rate than the non-military population. Within the blacks
the same results were found, but the whites had a high
school completion rate statistically comparable for both
the military and non-military population. Therefore, the





school completion rate is due to the overr epresenta tion of
blacks with a high school education in the military.
2
.
Mental Aptitude by Race
When comparing Table 11 with Table 3, it is readily
apparent that the IQ distributions were associated with racial
differences. Whereas the blacks were concentrated in the
lower two quintiles, 68.4%, the whites on the other hand,
were more heavily represented in the upper two fifths, 53.6%.
Table 11 shows that the black IQ distribution in the
population was not significantly different than in the military,
while the IQ distribution for whites was significantly different
(a = .0006). The military whites were significantly under-
represented (a = .0000) in the upper fifth when compared with
the non-military whites. Although the black IQ proportions
were variable throught the scale, the distribution of IQ '
s
for blacks in the military were not significantly different
(at the .05 level) from blacks in the population.
3 Geographic Regions by Race
The discussion previously concerning Sou th/non-Sou th




Years of School Completed by Race, 1973
WHITES
<12 years 12 years >12 years
Military 29 193 117
(8.6) (56.9) (34.5)
Non-military 105 327 584
(10.3) (32.2) (57.5)
TOTALS 134 520 701
(9.9) (38.4) (51.7)
2
X (2) = 67.30; significance = 0.0000
BLACKS
Military 19 81 23
(15.4) (65.9) (18.7)
Non-military 90 116 100
(29.4) (37! 9) (32.7)
TOTALS 109 197 123
(25.4) (45.9) (28.7)
2




IQ Distribution by Race
WHITES
Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Upper
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Mi litary 25 55 69 68 58
(9.1) (20.0) (25.1) (24.7) (21.1)
Non-military 59 104 153 156 256







(4) = 19.44; significance = 0.0006
BLACKS
Mi li tary 28 19 12 7 1
(41.8) (28.4) (17.9) (10.4) (1.5)
Non-military 62 23 26 11 4
(49.2) (18.3) (20.6) (8.7) (3.2)
TOTALS 90 42 38 18 5
(46.6) (21.8) (19.7) (19.3) (2.6)
X (4) = 3.33; significance = 0.5012
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these geographic regions was not significantly different.
Further breakdown by racial groups as illustrated in Table 12
shows that race had no impact on the distribution proportions.
In fact, the white and black cohorts each had a more representa-
tive distribution than the population as a whole. This is ex-
plained by the fact that other races (N =19) are included in
the total population cohort. Therefore, the military is
statistically representative in terms of the Sou th/non-Sou th
geographic regions for the full population and for both blacks
and whites
.
4 . Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental Family by Race
Reviewing the socioeconomic representativeness of the
cohort, it was found that the lower index levels were over-
represented and the higher levels were underrepr esented in
the military. When controlling for race the same results were
statistically significant for the whites ( ot = .0005). However,
for the blacks the opposite was true. Table 13 shows that the
military blacks were overr epresented (significantly at the .01
level) in the 100 plus index levels and underr epresented (a = .10)
below 100. The figures also indicate that a majority of the
whites came from families with higher index levels, while the
blacks came from families of lower index levels. Combining
these observations, it is concluded that although the military
population came from lower social index level families than the




























Index of Socioeconomic Status of Parental Family by Race
WHITES
Index Levels
0-80 81-100 101-121 121 Plu s
Military 29 101 144 56
(8.8) (30.6) (43.4) (17.0)
Non-military 75 217 429 272
(7.6) (21.9) (43.2) (27.4)
TOTALS 104 318 573 328
(7.9) (24.0) (43.3) (24.8)
x (3) = 19.24; significance = 0.0002
BLACKS
Military 36 48 25 4
(31.9) (42.5) (22.1) (3.5)
Non-military 116 100 48 5
(43. 1) (37.2) (17.3) (1.9)
TOTALS 152 148 73 9





X (3) = 4.83; significance = Q.1845
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underrepres ented below the index of 100 and the military
whites were overrepresented .
5
.
Rotter Scale by Race
The results described in Table 14 provide the same
conclusions for the military and non-military population
when controlled for by race, as those found for the entire
population. That is, men in the military (whether white or
black) were significantly (a = .0000) more internal in the
belief that their behavior is relatively decisive in deter-
mining their fate. There is however, a significantly (at
the .05 level) larger percentage of blacks, 26.4%, who are
classificed as externals than whites, 22.5%.
6 Duncan Index by Race
The social status scores described by Duncan index
for the chohort earlier in Table 9 were controlled mostly by
the white population group. As indicated in Table 15, only
38.6% of the whites had fathers whose occupations were on the
low end of the scale (0-20). The blacks on the other hand,
had more than twice that proportion, 83.2%, with the same
low range of values. The Duncan index distribution was
statistically the same for black military and black non-
military, whereas the low Duncan index for whites ( a = .003)




Rotter Scale by Race
WHITES
INDEX LEVELS
11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44




















TOTALS 350 324 377 230 75
(25.8) (23.9) (27.8) (17.0) (5.5)
(4) = 102.60; significance = 0.0000
BLACKS












TOTALS 106 91 119 78 35
(24.7) (21.2) (27.7) (18.2) (8.2)




Duncan Index by Race
WHITES
INDEX LEVELS
0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Military 144 29 37 41 50 19
(45.0) (9.1) (11.6) (12.8) (15.6) (5.9)
Non-military 346 83 110 120 203 89
(36.4) C8.7) (11.6) (12.6) (21.3) (9.4)
TOTALS 490 112 147 161 253 108
(38.6) (8.8) (11.6) (12.7) (19.9) (8.5)
X
2 (5) = 11.88; significance = 0.0364
BLACKS
Military 90 5 6 4 1
(84.9) (4.7) (5.7) (3.8) (0.0) (0.9)
Non-military 222 22 11 3 6 5
(82.5) (8.2) (4.1) (1.1) (2.2) (1.9)
TOTALS 312 27 17 7 6 6
(83.2) (7.2) (4.5) (1.9) (1.6) (1.6)
2
X (5) = 7.37; significance = 0.1944
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7 . Education by Geographic Region
Looking at the education of the cohort divided into
the two respective Sou th/non-South regions, it was found
that the non-Southerners were better educated, both in terms
of high school completion and in college experience (a = .0000).
Even so, the military subgroups in each of the regions are
once again underr epresented in terms of college education,
as discovered earlier for the entire cohort. But, the re-
presentativeness of high school graduates is significantly
different from the cohort as a whole, when controlling for
geographic regions. The completion rates between non-Southern
military and non-Southern non-military was statistically the
same ( o. = .237). The Southern military, however, had a sign-
ificantly (a = .0039) higher completion rate, 87.2%, than the
Southern non-military, 78.5%. Therefore, the overr epre sentation
of high school graduates in the military for the full popula-
tion is a direct result of the overrepre senta tion of high
school graduates in the military found in the Southern region.
This is not surprising, since earlier in this study the military
was found to have also been overrepr esented in terms of black
high school graduates. The blacks in the cohort constitute
45% of the Southerners, while the whites make up 91% of the
non-Southern population. Therefore, the blacks have a signifi-




In summary, the military was underrepresented in terms
of college education. When controlling the cohort- by region
and/or race, the same result was found. Yet, in terms of
high school graduates, the military was found to be over-
represented. Again, when controlling for region, this
was found to be true only in the South. The overrepresentation
of Southern high school graduates in the military is due to
an overrepresentation of Southern blacks and an overrepresenta-
tion of high school graduates in the black cohort.
TABLE 16
Years of School Completed by Geographic Region by Race, 1973
COHORT
SOUTH NON-SOUTH
< 12 12 > 12 < 12 12 > 12
Years Years Years Years Years Year s
Mili- 25 122 48 23 154 92
tary (12.8) (62.6) (24.6) (8.6) (57.2) (34.2)
Non- 117 191 236 80 254 461




















<12 12 >12 <12 12 >12
Years Years Years Years Years Years
Mili- 10 61 29 19 132 88
tary (10.0) (61.0) (29.0) (7.9) (55.2) (36.8)
Non- 44 103 159 61 224 425
mi li tary (14.4) (33.7) (52.0) (8.6) (31.5) (59.9)
TOTALS 54 164 188 80 356 513
(13.3) (40.4) (46.3) (8.4) (37.5) (54.1)
x





= 44.38; sig, = 0.0000
BLACKS
Mili- 15 61 19 4 20 4
tary (15. 8) (64. 2) (20. 0) (14 3) (71 4) (14 3)
Non- 73 88 76 17 28 24
mi 1 i tary (30 8) (37. 1) (32 1) (24. 6) (40. 6) (34. 8)
TOTALS 88 149 95 21 48 28
(26. 5) (44. 9) (28. 6) (21. 6) (49. 5) (28. 9)
(2) = 20.30; sig. = 0.0000
x
(2) = 7.72; sig, = 0.0211
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8 . Mental Aptitude by Geographic Region
When controlling the IQ distribution for geographic
regions it was found that the South was statistically well
represented (a = .1885). Additional Chi-square tests
showed that while the Southern military was well-represented
in the highest quintile, the non-Southern military was under-
represented (at the .01 level). Table 17 shows that Southerners
as a whole were concentrated more in the lower three fifths,
while the non-Southerners had a higher proportion in the upper
two-fifths. These results were as expected, since blacks
had a dynamic impact on the South population and the distribu-
tions were pretty much the same as those found when race was
the controlling variable.
The figures correspond somewhat with the education
variable. They indicate that those who had a lower IQ value
also tended to have a lesser amount of education, namely the
Southern blacks. The figures also support that racial biases
may be evident in the IQ tests since the overall black scores
were well below the white scores, regardless of geographic
region
.
9 . Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental Family by
Geographic Region
After reviewing the socioeconomic status of the cohort,
where the military was significantly overr epresented'. in the




IQ Distribution by Geographic Region by Race
SOUTH POPULATION
Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Higher
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Military 30 34 28 20 18
(23.1) (26.2) (21.5) (15.4) (13.8)
Non-military 74 52 59 45 63
(25.3) (17.7) (20.1) (15.4) (21.5)
TOTALS 104 86 87 65 81
(24.6) (20.3) (20.6) (15.4) (19.1)
X
2 (4) = 6.15; significance = 0.1885
SOUTH WHITES
Military 10 21 19 15 18
(12.0) (25.3) (22.9) (18.1) (21.7)
Non-military 24 37 44 42 58
(11.7) (18.0) (21.5) (20.5) (28.3)
TOTALS 34 58 63 57 76
(11.8) (20.1) (21.9) (19.8) (26.4)
X





Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Higher
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Military 20 13 9 5
(42.6) (27.7) (19.1) (10.6) (0.0)
Non-military 50 15 15 3 4
(57.5) (17.2) (17.2) (3.4) (4.6)
TOTALS 70 28 24 8 4
(52.2) (20.9) (17.9) (6.0) (3.0)
2
X (4) = 7.75 ; significance = 0.1012
NON-SOUTH POPULATION
Military 23 40 53 56 41
(10.8) (18.8) (24.9) (26.3) (19.2)
Non-military 47 78 122 123 205
(8.2) (13.6) (21.2) (21.4) (35.7)
TOTALS 70 118 175 179 246
(8.9) (15.0) (22.2) (22.7) (31.2)
2





Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Higher
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Military 15 34 50 53 40
(7.8) (17.7) (26.0) (27.6) (20.8)
Non-military 35 67 109 114 198
(6.7) (12.8) (20.8) (21.8) (37.9)
TOTALS 50 101 159 167 238
(7.0) (14.1) (22.2) (23.4) (33.3)
?
X (4) = 18.60; significance = 0.0009
NON-SOUTH BLACKS
Military 8 6 3 2 1
(40.0) (30.0) (15.0) (10.0) (5.0)
Non-military 12 8 11 8
(30.8) (20.5) (28.2) (20.5) (0.0)
TOTALS 20 14 14 10 1
(33.9) (23.7) (23.7) (16.9) (1.7)
2
X (4) = 4.62; significance - 0.3289
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and the socioeconomic status by race, where the blacks were
overrepr esented in the military above the index of 120 and
underr epr e sent ed below 100, it was expected that socioeconomic
trends associated with the cohort as a whole and the South
would follow the trends associated with the blacks. Table
18 shows that the conclusions concerning the non-South were
as expected. The non-Southern military was significantly
(a =.004) overrepresented below the value of 100 and sig-
nificantly ( a =.0000) underr epresented above 120. The
Southern results, however, were not as expected. The
military subgroup here, as found in the n. .i-Southern popula-
tion, was significantly (a*. 047) overrepresented below 100
and significantly (a = .021) underrepresented above the index
of 120.
There were also no regional differences in white
socioeconomic representation in the military. The whites,
whether from the South or non-South were consistently over-
represented in the military below the index level of 100,
and underrepresented above the level of 120 (at the .05 level).
The non-Southern blacks, on the other hand, were signifi
cantly well represented by the socioeconomic index across the
range of index values (at the .05 level). The Southern blacks
however, were again significantly underrepresented in the
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1 . Rotter Scale by Geographic Region
The Rotter scale results by geographic region were the
same as were found for the cohort. That is, the military pop-
ulation was significantly ( a = .0000) represented at the in-
ternal end of the scale. This is true for both the Southerners
and non-Southerners, whether black or white. Therefore, statis-
tically, people in the military believed that their behavior was
decisive in determining their fate, with no regional effects.
TABLE 19
Rotter Scale by Geographic Region by Race
SOUTH POPULATION
INDEX LEVELS
11-15 16-20 21.-25 26-30 31-44
Military 86 37 44 21 7
(44.1) (19.0) (22.6) (10.8) (3.6)
Non-military 102 139 149 114 41
(18.7) (25.5) (27.3) (20.9) (7.5)
TOTALS 188 176 193 135 48
(25.4) (23.8) (26.1) (18.2) (6.5)






11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Military 47 18 22 11 2
(47.0) (18.0) (22.0) (11.0) (2.0)
Non-military 66 77 84 62 18
(21.5) (25.1) (27.4) (20.2) (5.9)
TOTALS 113 95 106 73 20
(27.8) (23.3) (26.0) (17.9) (4.9)
(4) = 25.97; significance = 0.0000
SOUTH BLACKS
Mi 1 i tary 39 19 22 10 5
(41.1) (20.0) (23.2) (10.5) (5.3)
Non-mi 1 i tary 36 61 65 52 23
(15.2) (25.7) (27.4) (21.9) (9.7)
TOTALS 75 80 87 62 28
(22.6) (24.1) (26.2) (18.7) (8.4)






11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Military 131 43 51 34 10
(48.7) (16.0) (19.0) (12.6) (3.7)
Non-military 142 200 257 144 52
(17.9) (25.2) (32.3) (18.1) (6.5)
TOTALS 273 243 308 178 62
(25.7) (22.8) (28.9) (16.7) (5.8)
2
x; (4) = 100.65; significance = 0.0000
NON-SOUTH WHITES
Military 111 42 47 30 9
(46.4) (17.6) (19.7) (12.6) (3.8)
Non-military 126 187 224 127 46
(17.7) (26.3) (31.5) (17.9) (6.5)
TOTALS 237 229 271 157 55
(25.0) (24.1) (28.6) (16.5) (5.8)
x






11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Military 19 1 4 3 1
(67.9) (3.6) (14.3) (10.7) (3.6)
Non-military 12 10 28 13 6
(17.4) (14.5) (40.6) (18.8) (8.7)
TOTALS 31 11 32 16 7
(32.0) (11.3) (33.0) (16.5) (7.2)
2
X (4) = 23.66; significance = 0.0001
11. Duncan Index by Geographic Reg ion
Occupations of fathers vary by geographic residence
Although both regions had a large proportion of low status
(0-20) jobs, the Southerners had a significantly (a = .0000)
higher percentage, 59.5%, than the non-Southerners, (41.0%).
The military subgroup was overrepre senta tive at the lower
end of the status scale in both regions (at the .05 level).
Table 20 shows that the white proportions were significantly
the same as was found for the population within each region.
That is, they too were over represented at the lower end of
70

the scale (0-20), well represented in the mid-range values
(21-60), and underrepre sented at the upper end (61-plus).
The military blacks, on the other hand, were well
represented in the non-South region across the range of
values ( a = .26), and more so in the Southern region ( ct = .74).
Even though, it is interesting to note that the Southern blacks
in total had fathers whose occupations were lower on the Duncan
index, 86.7% in the 0-20 range, than the non-Southern blacks,
70.7% in the same range. This was statistically significant at
a = .0003. The white socioeconomic status was approximately
the same regardless of regional differences.
TABLE 20
Duncan Index by Geographic Region by Race
SOUTH POPULATION
INDEX LEVELS
0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Military 114 15 16 13 10 7
(65.1) (8.6) (9.1) (7.4) (5.7) (4.0)
Non-military 291 34 32 41 74 31
(57.9) (6.8) (6.4) (.8.2) (14.7) (6.2)
TOTALS 405 49 48 54 84 38
(59.7) (7.2) (7.1) (8.0) (12.4) (5.6)
X
2






0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Military 40 12 12 12 10 6
(43.5) (13.0) (13.0) (13.0) (10.9) (6.5)
Non-military 111 23 24 38 69 27
(38.0) (7.9) (8.2) (13.0) (23.6) (9.2)
TOTALS 151 35 36 50 79 33
(39.3) (9.1) (9.4) (13.0) (20.6) (8.6)
2
x (5) = 10.46; significance = 0.0632
SOUTH BLACKS
Military 74 3 4 1 1
(89.2) (3.6) (4.8) (1.2) (0.0) (1.2)
Non-military 180 11 8 2 5 4
(85.7) (5.2) (3.8) (1.0) (2.4) (1.9)
TOTALS 254 14 12 3 5 5
(86.7) (4.8) (4.1) (1.0) (1.7) (1.7)













27 33 40 13
(10.7) (13.0) (15.8) (5.1)
93 84 138 6 3
(12.7) (11.5) (18.8) (8.6)
TOTALS 404 91
(41.0) (9.2)
120 117 178 76
(12.2) (11.9) (18.1) (7.7)








25 29 40 13
(11.0) (12.7) (17.5) (5.7)
86 82 134 62
(13.1) (12.4) (20.3) (9.4)
TOTALS 339 77 111 111 174 75
(38.2) (8.7) (12.5) (12.5) (19.6) (8.5)






0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Military 16 2 2 3
(69.6) (8.7) (8.7) (13.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Non-Military 42 11 3 1 1 1
(71.2) (18.6) (5.1) (1.7) (1.7) (1.7)
TOTALS 58 13 5 4 1 1
(70.7) (15.9) (6.1) (4.9) (1.2) (1.2)
2
X (5) = 6.54; significance = 0.2570
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF INDUCTEES VERSUS ENLISTEES
The previous sections described the characteristics of a
specific age cohort during the years 1966 - 1973. The
cohort was partitioned by race and geographic regions in order
to measure representativeness in the military across several
socioeconomic characteristics. This section describes dif-
ferences in the characteristics of those who were drafted and
those who enlisted into the Armed Forces.
The NLS inquired as to how those who were in the military
had entered the Armed Forces. Two of the responses were
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"draft" and "enlistment". The number of the previous cohort
group selected who answered this question was very limited
and it would make it impossible to extract a large enough
sample for statistical reliability. Therefore, instead of
sampling only the 1966 14-17 year-olds, the entire NLS
(everyone who was 14-24 years of age in 1966) was used. The
new cohort for examining the characteristics consisted of
N=964 young men. It should be further s tated , however , that
it was impossible from the information provided to distinquish
between a true enlistee and an enlistee who signed an obligation
in order to avoid being drafted into the Army or Marine Corps.
Cooper approximates that 60% of all enlis tees were draft motivated
The enlistment program for the services had changed some-
what during the Vietnam era. The Army and Marine Corps each •
had a two-year program which gave those individuals who vol-
unteered an opportunity for choice of training. The Navy
likewise had what was called the two-by-six program which in-
cluded two years of active duty and six years of reserve
duty. A number of enlistees signed for these obligations to
avoid being drafted into combat arms. In FY 1970, 23.5% of
the Army enlistees, 40.9% of the Marine Corps recruits, and
30.1% of the Navy accessions were obligated for only two




Cooper, R. V. L., op cit, p. 20
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Information paper,
29 July 1979. 75

Shields, using the same NLS data, attempted to measure
the effect of the draft on enlistment by the years of draft
eligibility. Her draft pressure variable covered the years
of highest draft calls, 1966, 1967, and 1968 and included
the period an individual was most susceptible to induction -
the year following a person's 18th birthday. Her enlistment
variable included all those who responded to the method of
entry questions as enlisting plus all those in the military
who did not respond and had at least 26 months of active
military service. This may be a good attempt to measure draft
pressure, but it still falls short in describing the "true
enlis tee."
Shields found that "draft pressure had a strong and sig-
nificant influence on the enlistment behavior of both racial
groups. Nevertheless, its impact was greatest on white en-
listment; 28% of the whites volunteered during the periods
23
of high draft calls versus 22% of the blacks."
With these hypotheses in mind, this section will describe
representativeness of the enlistee as compared to the draftee
by describing the characteristics of only those individuals who
actually answered either "draft" or "enlistment" as their
method of entry on the interview que
s
tionaire . Although, with
23 Shields, P. M. op cit, p. 21
76

today's All-Volunteer Force the comparisons may be mute,
the description of the two groups may provide some insight
into the composition of the Armed Forces should the country
revert to a form of conscription at some future time.
1. Ed uca t io n
The education variable again is the number of years
of school completed as of 1973 and is therefore a measure of
total education, not just education prior to service entry.
Table 21 presents the information for the new cohort of military
veterans and shows that 87.4% had at least a high school educa-
tion. The figures for veterans with some college education were
higher than previously found since this new cohort had had a
longer opportunity to take advantage of post-service education
benefits .
When comparing the draftees with the enlistees it was
found that both groups had (a = .41) comparable proportions
of high school graduates. A higher proportion of enlistees,
37.4%, attended college than draftees, 32.3%, however, Chi-
square tests revealed no difference at the .05 level (a =.074)
After separating the cohort into racial groups, the
figures represented in Table 21 show that the whites had
comparable proportions of enlistees and draftees who had a
high school education ( o* .30) or some college education
( ci= .38). The blacks, on the other hand, had a higher pro-
portion of enlisted veterans, 27.0%, with college experience
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than draftees, 16.1%. Because of small samples, Chi-square
tests indicated that this difference again was not significant
( a = .052).
In conclusion, when describing educational attain-
ment, a high percentage of veterans had a high school education.
Significantly comparable proportions of white enlistees and
draftees had college experience. The blacks, however, had
a higher proportion of enlisted veterans than draftees with
some college education. The numbers involved in the compar-
ison are too small to confirm this difference as statistically
significant at the. 05 level, but it indicates that a relation-
ship may exist between enlistment and college education for
the black veteran.
2 . Mental Aptitude
Table 22 describes the IQ distributions of the service
veteran cohort. The proportions show that the IQ levels were
the same (significant at the .05 level) in all quintiles ex-
cept for the lower fifth where a higher percentage of draftees
were distributed. White enlistees, and white draftees had the
same distribution ( a = .79) across the range of mental ability,
while the black draftees showed a higher proportion in the lower
quintiles ( a = .01). Although the numbers for the blacks were
again small, those in the upper two IQ qunitiles of the veteran
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X (2) = 4.10; significance = 0.1287
In summary, black enlistment proportions were significantly
below black draft proportions for the veteran with a low mental
ability (the lower quintile). On the other hand, draft and
enlistment proportions did not vary significantly across mental
ability categories for whites.
TABLE 22
Method of Entry by IQ Distribution by Race
VETERANS
Lower 4th 3rd 2nd Higher
Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth Fifth
Draftees 60 56 62 35 31















Enlistees 71 124 123 94 77
(14.5) (25.4) (25.2) (19.2) (15.7)
TOTALS 131 180 175 129 108
(18.1) (24.9) (24.2) (17.8) (14.9)
X (4) = 13.77; significance = 0.0081
WHITES
Draftees 25 43 41 30 31
(14.7) (25.3) (24.1) (17.6) (18.2)
Enlistees 51 105 113 89 74
(11.8) (24.3) (26.2) (20.6) (17.1)
TOTALS 76 148 154 119 105
(12.6) (24.8) (25.6) (19.8) (17.4)
X
2 (4) = 1.68; significance = 0.7936
BLACKS
Draftees 35 12 11 2
(58.3) (20.0) (18.3) (3.3) (0.0)
Enlistees 20 16 10 5 3
(37.0) (29.6) (18.5) (9.3) (5.6)
TOTALS 55 28 21 7 3
(48.2) (24.6) (18.4) (6.1) (2.6)
X (4) = 8.70; significance = 0.0689

3 . Race
Although the individual characteristics of the veteran
cohort have been described to this point by race, it is im-
portant to examine the question of entry method in order to
determine the effects of race. Table 23 lists the propor-
tions of whites and blacks who were either drafted or en-
listed. Percentages in this case are column percentages.
It is evident and statistically significant ( % a .0000)
that black veterans have a much higher incidence of being
drafted, 54.4%, than whites, 27.1%. This indicates that
the advantage of enlistment is being taken more often by
the white participants in the military.
These figures support the evidence found by the Mar-
shall Commission in 1966 that "proportionately more (30%)
Negroe s . . . are drafted than whites (18%)." The figures also
indicate that this trend continued through the years of higher
draft calls (during the height of the Vietnam War) at even
greater proportions.
These findings are however, contrary to what Shields
discovered using the same NLS data. She found that the pro-
pensity to enlist was equal for both the blacks and whites
(approximately 19% of the total population). Why the dis-
parity? The differences lie in the method of extraction of
24 ...
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Services,
op ci t




data and the method of comparison. Whereas this study used
only the individuals who categorized themselves as .either
draftees or enlistees on the NLS method of entry questions,
Shields included as volunteers all those who failed to re-
spond to the question and had 26 or more months of active
duty. Thus, her cohort may include draftees. Additionally,
this study compares enlistees and draftees within the veteran
cohort, while Shields compares enlistments only to the eligible
population .
In summary, eligible blacks were much more susceptible
to being drafted than whites. The education variable supports
these findings since a higher proportion of whites had some
college education and therefore could use the student deferment
in greater proportions. Historically, whites had lower mental
disqualification rates, as evidenced by IQ distributions,
therefore providing a much larger white population from which
to induct a relatively smaller proportion of individuals. Blacks,
on the other hand, had a smaller eligible pool from which a
relatively high percentage could be drafted.
4 . Geographic Region s
Since the black veteran had a significantly higher
likelihood of being drafted, and since the black population
in the NLS was predominantly from the South, it was hypothesized




Method of Entry by Race
Wh i t e s Blacks Totals
Draftees 206
(27.1)










TOTALS 761 195 956
Notes :
1. Parentheses indicate col uran percentages.
than the non-Southerners. This was found to be statistically
(a =
.005) correct as shown in the results described in Table
24. A high proportion, 38. 2%, of all Southern veterans had
been drafted while only 29.2% of the non-Southerners were in-
ducted. But what was surprising, was that these results were
not controlled by the blacks as expected. Both the Southern
whites and blacks had a higher percentage of draftees, but
neither racial group alone was significantly different be-
tween regions. Therefore, Southerners had a significantly
higher proportion of veterans who were drafted than non-
Southerners. And, although the Southern white and black
veteran populations each had a higher proportion of draftees
than their non-Southern counterparts, the difference was not
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statistically significant (at the .05 level). This indicates
that non-Southerners were able to use deferments as a way of




Method of Entry by Geographic Region by Race
VETERANS
Non-South South Totals
Draftees 185 131 316
(29.2) (38.0) (32.8)
Enlis tees 434 214 648
(70.1) (62.0) (67.2)
TOTALS 619 345 964
(1) = 6.21; significance = 0.0127
WHITES
Dra f tees 141 65 206
(26.3) (29.0) (27.1)
Enlis tees 396 159 555
(73.7) (71.0) (72.9)
TOTALS 537 224 761






















TOTALS 76 119 195
X (1) = 0.057; significance = 0.8106
Notes :
1. Parentheses indicate column percentages
5 . Index of Socioeconomic Level of Parental Family
Table 25 displays the distribution of veterans across
the socioeconomic index levels. Examining the data, it was
found that draftees were from families with lower index values
(0 - 100). Within the white sector, the same result was found.
The blacks, on the other hand, were significantly (ata. - .05)
well represented with respect to both draftees and enlistees.
This was not surprising since almost three-fourths of the total
blacks in the military were from low index families.
Therefore, the findings show that the socioeconomic in-
dex had an association with whether an individual enlisted' or
was drafted. Those with a lower index, especially the whites,
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tended to be drafted. Those with higher levels used en-
listment as a method of entry into the military.
TABLE 25
Method of Entry by Index of Socioeconomic Status
of Parental Family by Race
VETERANS
INDEX LEVELS
0-80 81-100 101-121 121 Plus
Draftees 65 103 93 35
(22.0) (34.8) (31.4) (11.8)
Enlistees 68 191 244 105
(11.2) (31.4) (40.1) (17.3)
TOTALS 133 294 337 140
(14.7) (32.5) (37.3) (15.5)
X
2 (3) 24.28; significance = 0.0000
WHITES
Draftees 28 65 72 34
(14.1) (32.7) (36.2) (17.1)
Enlistees 47 155 222 101
(9.0) (29.5) (42.3) (19.2)
TOTALS 75 220 294 135
(10.4) (30.4) (40.6) (18.6)










(38. 7) (38. 7)
20 36
(25. 3) (45. 6)
56 72












X (3) = 6.50; significance = 0.0897
6 . Rotter Scale
It was found earlier that the veteran consistently
displayed beliefs that his behavior influenced his fate.
Given a choice as to whether an individual would enlist or
be drafted, it was hypothesized that the most internal in-
dividuals would tend to enlist rather than be inducted. The
results in Table 26 disproved this hypothesis and they showed
that draftees were significantly (a = .0000) more internal
(below the index level of 15). These same results were
found when examining the veterans by race.
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In summary, draftees consistently displayed significantly
greater internal beliefs than enlistees that they have control
of their fate. This was surprising since conscription is an ex-
ternal force which exerts strong influences on what happens to
an ind ividual .
TABLE 26




11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Draftees 201 35 48 23 9
(63. 6) (11.1) (15.,2) (7.3) (2,,8)
Enl is tees 327 127 126 54 14
(50. 5) (19.6) (19.,4) (8.3) (2,,2)
TOTALS 528 162 174 77 23
(54.,8) (16.8) (18. 0) (8.0) (2. 4)






































11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-44
Draftees 73 10 11 9 3
(68.9) (9.4) (10.4) (8.5) (2.8)
Enlistees 49 9 20 10 1
(55.1) (10.1) (22.5) (11.2) (1.1)
TOTALS 122 19 31 19 4
(62.6) (9.7) (15.9) (9.7) (2.1)
2
X (4) = 7.01; significance = 0.1353
7 . Duncan Index
The Duncan index distributions described in Table
27 show that draftees had a significantly (a = .04) greater
proportion of individuals from low Duncan index families.
Beyond the index of 20, however, the proportions of enlistees
and draftees were statistically the same (at the .05 level).
When testing for homogeneity among the races it was found
that each race was well represented in both the draft and
enlisted ranks across the entire range of values. But, since
the blacks were highly concentrated in the low range (0-20).
and since they accounted for 46.2% of the total veteran draftees
and only 20.7% of the total enlistees in the same range, they had
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a significant effect on the Duncan index distribution of




Method of Entry by Duncan Index by Race
VETERANS
INDEX VALUES
0-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-70 71 Plus
Draftees 159 26 21 31 39 8
(56.0) (9.2) (7.4) (10.9) (13.7) (2.8)
Enlistees 301 55 64 70 96 19
(49.8) (9.1) (10.6) (11.6) (15.9) (3.1)
TOTALS 460 81 85 101 135 27
(51.7) (9.1) (9.6) (11.4) (15.2) (3.0)
_
X (5) = 4.22; significance = 0.5179
_____
Draftees 84 19 17 29 37 8
(43.3) (9.8) (8.8) (14.9) (19.1) (4.1)
Enlistees 238 49 59 66 91 19
(45.6) (9.4) (11.3) (12.6) (17.4) (3.6)
TOTALS 322 68 76 95 128 27
(45.0) (9.5) (10.6) (13.3) (17.9) (3.8)
X
2 (5) = 1.92; significance = 0.8606
BLACKS
Draftees 72 7 4 2 1
(83.7) (8.1) (4.7) (2.3) (1.2) (0.0)
Enlistees 62 6 4 4 3
(78.5) (7.6) (5.1) (5.1) (3.8) (0.0)
TOTALS 134 13 8 6 4
(81.2) (7.9) (4.8) (3.6) (2.4) (0.0)
2
X (4) = 2.20; significance = 0.6996
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V . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis was concerned with the socioeconomic and
quality representativeness of the military during the final
seven years of Selective Service. The first part of the
study provided a historical context of the draft as it
evolved through its many stages to the time when the All-
Volunteer Force was instituted. The question as to who will
serve when not everyone serves has consistently been a major
concern of the military, and has been a most important factor
in the debate concerning the representativeness of the All-
Volunteer Force.
The second part of the study examined individual and
socioeconomic characteristics of a 1966 cohort of 14-17
year-olds extracted from the National Longitudinal Surveys
of 1966 through 1973. These characteristics were compared
within the cohort between two subgroups: (1) those who served
in the military during the survey years, and (2) those who had
no military experience. A detailed look at a veteran cohort
comparing the same characteristics of draftees with those of
enlistees was also undertaken. Results of the comparisons
and conclusions derived from the findings are summarized in
thi s chapter
.
Within the cohort 34.6% of the young men had military
service. Beginning with educational attainment it was found
93

that a significantly larger proportion of these veterans
were high school graduates than were the civilians. However,
more civilians had some college education, regardless of
race or regional differences. Within racial groups, the black
population had less educational attainment than the white
population, but the black veteran population had a higher
percentage of high school graduates than the black civilian
population. Whites on the other hand, had comparable pro-
portions of high school educated individuals in both the
military and civilian populations.
Regional differences found that people from the South
had less educational attainment than non-Southerners. The
Southern veteran population, however, had a higher proportion
of high school graduates while the non-Southern veteran popu-
lation had a comparable proportion of high school graduates
when compared with their respective civilian counterparts.
In conclusion, the military was underrepresented in terms of
college education, and overrepresented in proportions of
high school graduates. This result follows directly from
the overr epre sentat ion of Southern black high school graduates
who were in the military.
Regarding mental aptitude, results showed that the mili-
tary was overrepresented in the lower quintiles of IQ scores
and underrepresented in the highest quintile. With a racial
breakdown, military blacks were well represented across the
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distribution of IQ scores, while military whites were again
underrepresented in the upper quintile. Regional differences
again found the Southern population following the same trends
as the blacks; that is, they were well represented across the
distribution of scores. The non-Southern population, however,
was underrepresented in the higher score range and over-
represented in the lower ranges. Conclusions drawn, therefore,
were that the individual who had higher IQ scores was less apt
to enter the military and that the military population was
representative of the blacks and Southerners and unrepresentative
of the whites and non-Southerners when compared with the civilian
population
.
Racial composition of the military was inspected by
comparing participation rates within both the blacks and
whites, and although the blacks had a higher percentage of
their population in the military, the results were not sig-
nificantly different. Therefore, for the cohort selected,
the participation rates of the blacks in the military was
statistically the same as for the whites. This result was
as expected for the Gates Commission had found the same
results during approximately the same time frame.
Results also showed that the military was well represented
geographically. Race within each geographic region had no
impact on the participation rates.
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The socioeconomic characteristics however showed some
differences. The military was not representative of the
population since most of the veterans came from families
with a lower socioeconomic index score. While the whites
followed the trends of the population, the blacks were
just the opposite. Military blacks were from higher socio-
economic indexed families than their civilian counterpart.
The Duncan index also found the veteran overrepresented from
families where the head of household scored on the low end
of the scale. The black population, however, was well
represented in the military. The white military population
was not representative of the white civilian population.
By regions, Southerners were well represented in the military
while non-Southerners were underrepr esented at the high index
levels, and overrepresented at the low levels.
The Rotter scale results found the military population
to have a higher proportion of individuals who believed that
there was a strong, orderly relationship between their be-
havior and its consequences (internal locus of control).
These same results were found when controlling for racial
and regional differences.
After examination of the veteran cohort (which was com-
prised of all young men in the survey who answered the





(1) The enlistee gained higher educational attain-
ment than the draftee.
(2) Those veterans with lower mental ability, as
measured by IQ scores, tended to be drafted
rather than enlist. This was especially true
for the black veteran,
(3) The black veteran was more often a draftee,
while the white veteran had a high incidence
of enl i stment
.
(4) Southerners had a higher proportion of
draftees than non-Southerners.
(5) Draftees came from families with both lower
socioeconomic and Duncan index scores.
(6) Draftees scored most internal on the Rotter
scale
.
Therefore, not only was the military under conscription
unrepresentative of the population at large, draftees were
even more unrepresentative when compared to enlistees.
While the military veteran was overrepresented in terms of
less education, lower IQ, and lower socioeconomic status,
it was well representative in terms of race and geographic
residence. Most of the differences found, however, were a
direct result of the unrepresenta tivenes s in the inducted
veteran population. The enlisted population was much more
representative of the civilian population.
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This finding supports the hypothesis that conscription
as a method of manpower procurement, did not result in a
representative military and that it was the lower educated,
less informed individual who was more likely to end up
serving in the military. The results show that less well-
educated, lower socioeconomic groups were more likely to be
inducted. Perhaps fewer members of this sector of society
could afford the costs involved in avoiding the draft, such
as college deferment and draft-exempt occupations or had the
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